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Abstract 
 Institutions establish the rights to use resources efficiently for economic 
activities. Thus, this study focus on how institutions, specifically property rights for 
land, have induced utilisation of limited factor endowment, particularly land for 
achieving maximum productivity. Various land institutions exists as survival 
strategies of the farmer community, allowing farmers to manipulate the existing land 
regulations and mobilize the land resources, so as more efficient farmers have access 
to large land extents to cultivate, thus improve the productivity. Furthermore, the 
study found that farmers with a formal land deeds do not necessarily achieve higher 
land productivity. But, conservation of land resources and use of them efficiently for 
achieving high productivity are largely depending on the informal institutional factors 
rather than formal institutions.  
 
Key words: Formal Institutions, Informal Institutions, Land Productivity, Property 
Rights 
 
I. Introduction  
 Institutions are the rules and constraints that shape economic interaction. They 
include formal laws and rules and their enforcement mechanisms, but also customs, 
norms and traditions. It is widely acknowledged that “institutions matters” for 
economic development. Property rights for example, are the result of the interplay of 
formal law and customary norms, often part of the local culture. Customary norms 
evolve slowly, and are deeply embedded in behavioural patterns, which assist the 
formation of informal institutions. 
 Institutions engender the rights to use resources for economic activities: 
“institutions provide assurance respecting the actions of others, and give order and 
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stability to expectations in the complex and uncertain world of economic relations.” 
(Runge,1981:595). If a disequilibrium is perceived by the community regarding 
resource allocations due to constraints or pit falls of formal institutions, it creates 
incentives for informal institutional innovations, i.e. evolutions in customary norms.   
 According to North (1991), institutions improve productivity by lowering 
transaction and transformation costs. Institutions that lowered transaction costs are 
those that enabled the parties to exchange to specify and define the multiple valuable 
attribute of a good or service or the performance of agents or to enforce agreements at 
lower cost. Institutions that have lowered transformation costs have been those that 
have made possible the introduction or application of an improvement in technology. 
Institutions that lowered transaction costs mainly focus on 1) increase the mobility of 
capital; 2) lower information costs; 3) spread risks; and 4) improve the enforcement of 
contracts. 
 Institutions continue to evolve in response to changes in resource endowments. 
Institutions such as property rights and markets are more typically altered through the 
accumulation of “secondary” or incremental institutional changes such as 
modifications in contractual relations or shifts in the boundaries between market and 
non-market activities (Davis and North,1971: 9). Ruttan and Hyami (1984: 203 - 223) 
illustrate, from agricultural history, changes in resource endowments and technical 
change have induced changes in private property rights and in the development of 
non-market institutions. They also highlights that in other cases, where externalities 
are involved, substantial political resources may have to be brought to bear to 
organize non-market institutions in order to provide for the supply of public goods.  
 In this regard, this paper draws an example from an agricultural village in rural 
Sri Lanka to illustrate how formal and informal institutions, specifically property 
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rights for land, have induced changes in factor endowment, and productivity in the 
locale. It examines how informal institutions evolve as an alternative for formal 
institutional constraints, and the effectiveness of both of these institutions in 
managing the agricultural lands in the locale.  
 
II. Methodology for the Study 
 The Kiriibbanwawe Irrigation Unit1, in was selected for the study. First wave 
of resettlement in the locale were carried out in early 1950s`. The area was provided 
with new irrigation facilities recently under a Japanese ODA funded project. Data 
collection was carried out using (i) a series of questionnaire surveys, (ii) interviews 
with resource persons, (iii) case studies, and (iv) secondary data collection. Stratified 
random sampling was carried out, demarcating the irrigation canals as the main strata. 
A sample of 106 settlers was selected for the study, covering 25 percent of the total 
population and interviews were carried out using a structured questionnaire.  
 
a)  The Analytical Framework  
 Under a perfect market condition, allocation of land resource is associated 
with productivity gains for its beneficiaries, since they gain an asset.  Evidence shows 
that resettled farmers have better access to inputs and government services (Deininger 
et al., 2002; Jowah, 2005), which could give them a productivity advantage. On the 
other hand, markets in Sri Lanka, like in most developing countries, are imperfect 
                                                 
1 Development of the Walawe basin, a large-scale irrigation, resettlement and rural development project was 
initiated in the 1950s as some of the first in the wave of agrarian settlements of the post-World War II period in Sri 
Lanka. The project was conducted in several stages, where the Asian Development Bank funded the initial phase. 
Udawalawe reservoir water is conveyed to two irrigation canals: the Right bank main canal (RB) and the Left bank 
main canal (LB). It is divided in five major blocks demarcated for the convenience of administration by the 
Mahaweli authority: Chandrikawewa, Murawasihena and Angunakolapelessa on the Right Bank and 
Kiriibbanwawe and Sooriyawawe1on the Left Bank. Kiriibbanwawe Irrigation  Block, which is located in the 
middle of the LB, has four irrigation units. They are Habaraluwawe, Kiriibbannwawe, Habaralugala and 
Mahagama. Kiriibbanwawe irrigation unit was selected for this field survey. The sample survey was conducted 
during 2006 March/April. 
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which could negatively impact farm investments and subsequently farm productivity. 
This implies that the effect land redistribution on productivity among its beneficiaries 
is ambiguous.  
 The right to use the land property can be gained formally or informally (as will 
explain later in this paper). One interest of the study is to examine closely vis-à-vis 
the agricultural productivity differentials between beneficiaries’ of formal property 
rights and informal property rights.  
 Agricultural productivity is a measure of the total agricultural output that can 
be produced from a given set of inputs. In this analysis productivity is measured as the 
value of total agricultural output per hectare i.e. land productivity. Land productivity 
is important in determining food production, land use incentives and returns to 
landowners. Accordingly, we specify two productivity equations for a given 
household as: 
   Yj=f(RjXj )  -------- (1)  
   Yj=f(KjXj )  -------- (2)  
  
 where、Y is the value of total agricultural output per hectare for the jth land 
lot. A land lot is defined as a contiguous piece of land on which one or more crops 
can be cultivated. R, in the first equation, is a dummy indicating whether or not the 
household obtained the land lot via formal institutions, intended to capture whether or 
not formal institutional beneficiaries have a productivity advantage. K, in the second 
equation is also a dummy variable indicating whether the household has obtained land 
rights through an informal institution.  X is a vector of exogenous land characteristics 
and inputs used. These include standard factors of production, i.e. labour used per 
hectare (number of family and hired workers); the household head’s years of 
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education as an indicator of human capital; non-labour variable inputs, including the 
cost of chemical fertiliser and manure used per hectare; and traction power. We 
assume that the production function is given by a Cobb-Douglas production function 
such that the equation to be estimated becomes:  
   ln(Y)=βo+β1R+β2X+ ε  ---------- (3)  
   ln(Y)=δo+δ1K+ δ2X+ ε  ---------- (4)  
 
Where, βo, β1、β2, and δo, δ1, δ2 are parameters to be estimated and ε is an error term. 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression will be employed to estimate a Cobb-
Douglas production function that utilises the factors of production outlined above.  
  
III. Empirical Results and Discussion  
First, the formal and informal land institutions available in the locale will be outlined. 
Then how these institutions are influencing the production behaviour of an individual 
in the commune is discussed. 
 
a) Formal Land Institutions  
The patterns of land ownership and tenure in the cascade systems have been 
influenced by the colonial policies2 and land related regulations and acts during the 
post independent period.  The people in the system have Swarnabhumi, Jayabhumi 
titles, Land Development Ordinance (LDO) permits or are encroachers on crown 
                                                 
2 The land ownership pattern in the area differs from that in many old tank villages where land often belongs to the 
category of paraveni (lands in active use when the cadastral survey was done in 1900 by the British; these lands 
were treated as private property from ancestral times).  Absence of this type of land in Walawe cascade systems 
substantiates the fact that there were no communities occupying lands in this part of the country during the early 
parts of the British administration (Somaratne et al., 2005:27).  
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lands3. These deeds are not endowed with the total property right. Open market 
transaction or subdivision of the property is not allowed.  
As subdivision of land is not allowed in the resettlement schemes, the second 
generation, who are anticipating being involved in agriculture, has only two choices. 
One is to cultivate their father’s land. If the land holder has only one child, or only 
one child interested in agriculture, he can name him as the successor and the land 
permit provisions ensure the cultivating rights of the child. But if there are more than 
one descendant, they have to either share the land, compromising having the legal 
rights, or they have to get a lease or encroach land for cultivation, which is the second 
available choice. In sharing the land by the descendants, since the land area cultivated 
is small, it only permits subsistence farming, with little excess yield for the market. 
Thus leasing land and encroaching land for cultivation pose an attractive option for 
this new farming community.  
 
Land Encroachment: Cultivating land without legal rights in the study area is not 
uncommon. Mainly, two groups of land encroachers can be identified. One is the 
group of farmers practicing encroached farming because they do not have access to 
other legal land. The other group of farmers practice encroached farming, in order to 
increase their land extent, in addition to their legally received land. As shown in Table 
1, land encroachments of irrigated lands are greater than non-irrigated land, and most 
of them (68 percent) are land less farmers.  
 
                                                 
3 A land grant is given to the owner of a land permit after one year, for an up land and after 3 years for a paddy 
lands. Two types of land grants are there. One is the ‘Swarnabhoomy’ deeds, which are issued under the Mahaweli 
ordinance no.22 by the Director General of MASL. The other one is ‘Jayabhoomy’ deeds, issued under section 
19.4 of Land Development Ordinance by the President of Sri Lanka. Apart from the cultivation rights given by the 
land permit, consumption rights of many resources including forests, except the mineral resources, in the land is 
given to the owner. The owner can sell the land only under the permission of the RPM, with the preparation of the 
deed by an authorized Notary-of-law. This land grant can be used as collateral for many banks in taking loans. 
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Table 1 Distribution of Encroached Lands                (Percentage) 
Category Irrigated land Non-irrigated land 
Encroachers with own land 10.2 3.1 
Encroachers without own land 68.4 7.0 
Encroached land leased out 3.1 3.0 
Encroached land leased in 3.6 3.1 
Total encroached  84.1 15.8 
Source: Survey data collected during 2006 March/April 
 
b) Informal Land Institutions  
   Formal land institutions impose many bureaucratic procedures towards land 
lease. This increases the transaction cost of leasing the land in concurrence to formal 
procedure. Restrictions imposed by the formal institutions towards possessing or 
increasing land assets have evolved informal institutional resolutions.   
  In the informal setting, two land exchange systems were widely practiced in 
the study area. These two systems are called ‘Ande’ and ‘Badde’ systems. There are 
not much difference between the exchange provisions of the two systems, but bade 
system indicates a long term land lease, where as ‘Ande’ system is on average only 
for a 2 to 3 year period. The tenants have the secure access to the field, but provide a 
stipulated yield as rent to the absentee land owner, in this case the land permit holder. 
The practice of these two land renting systems in the study area is shown in Table 2. 
In the ‘Ande’ system, mostly the land owner provides all the seed and fertilizer 
requirements in the study area4. The person holding a land permit has access to seed 
                                                 
4 This differs with the most common land tenure practices in the country where, the land lord and tenant share 
50:50 in seeds and fertilizer inputs and the land lord gets 25 percent of the total harvest, as been provided by the 
paddy land act in 1958. 
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and fertilizer at subsidized prices. Therefore the general practice in the area is for the 
land permit holder to buy the fertilizer and seed at the subsidized price and provide it 
to the cultivator.  The yield share varies with each and every agreement with the two 
parties, but the average is around 750 kg per acre per season. This amount usually 
does not change upon yield. In the ‘Badde’ system, the land owner shares less 
responsibility as all seed and fertilizer is provided by the cultivator himself. The yield 
share in this system also varies according to the agreement, but the average is 700 kg 
per acre per season to the land owner.  
 
Table 2 Provisions of Land Exchange Systems            
Land exchange system Terms of exchange (Cultivator: Land owner) 
100:0 (6.6) Input share 
   0:100 (11.3) 
Ande 
Yield share Rest of the Yield:758.8kg/ac 
Input share   100:0 (10.6) Badde 
Yield share Rest of the Yield:701.1kg/ac 
Note: The value in parenthesis shows the percentage of farmers practicing above 
systems. 
Source: Survey data collected during 2006 March/April 
 
  
 The farmers who cultivate land under “Ande” and “Badde” systems can be 
identified as follows: One group consists of the first generation land holders, whose 
land is now cultivated by their second generation. The land holder has rented the land 
to his children, to cultivate and receives only the rent, for his subsistence5. In this case, 
if more than one cultivator is sharing the land, in the case the land holder has many 
children, the children divides the rest in equal shares. This is mainly subsistence 
paddy farming. The other group of cultivators is the large scale market oriented 
                                                 
5 Renting out to own family members result lower rent (less than average) compared to renting out to non family 
members. 
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cultivators. Apart from cultivating their own land, they rent in nearby lands, in order 
to increase their scale of cultivated land, thus increase the profit. 
  
c) Productivity Estimates  
 Two modes of land acquisition are identified.  Specifically 1) land acquisition 
through formal institutions, i.e. formal land deed holders versus encroached land 
holders; and 2) land acquisition through informal institutions, i.e. land holders who 
has possessed or increased their holdings through informal institutions versus people 
who do not possessed land through informal institutions.  Table 3 represent results 
from OLS estimation of Cobb-Douglas production function.   
  
Table 3  Estimated of Production Functions  
Mode of Acquisition 
Formal Institution Informal Institution 
Variable 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Ownership  0.091 0.16 0.247** 0.62 
Fertilizer   0.163 0.22 0.163** 0.21 
Traction 0.061 0.02 0.054** 0.02 
Labour 0.481 0.11 0.514** 0.12 
Land Conservation#  0.404*** 0.02 0.285* 0.02 
Level of Education 0.174** 0.07 0.161** 0.08 
R-Squared    0.413    0.434 
Note : *Significant at 10%   **Significant at 5%   *** Significant at 1%  
 #Land Conservation was evaluated by estimating the cost incurred by a farmer 
for land conservation practices, either by investing in equipments or labour. 
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 The regression revealed interesting results highlighting the insignificance of 
the formal land ownership and use of conventional inputs in agricultural productivity; 
i.e. Farmers with a formal land deed do not necessarily achieve higher land 
productivity than encroached farmers. Having the rights of proprietor does not 
significantly effect investment decisions, productivity (Place and Hazell, 1993; 
Migot-Adholla et al., 1991), and access to credit (Feder et al., 1988; Anderson and 
Lueck, 1992). 
 Two reasons can be stated to apprehend this situation. First, most of agrarian 
services including irrigation in the locale are highly subsidised in nature. Thus, the 
collateral benefits associated with property right may not have that much of impact, in 
terms of capital requirement. Secondly, the land used by the encroachers potentially is 
of significantly better quality. The encroachers always attempt to get the best land 
available for cultivation. Thus their most interested area is the reservation area6 of the 
tank, where abundant water is available for cultivation7. These encroached farmers 
usually do not like to shift from their land, because they perceive that any land option 
available at another place is substandard to his current possession. Land encroachment 
in the locale is not necessarily looked at as an invasion, rather a necessity. Villagers 
see the encroached farmers as their peers, where some of themselves are practicing it, 
and view it as a practical solution for a landless farmer to be engaged in. therefore 
encroached farmers in the locale are not excluded from most benefits the local 
community are entitled to.  Furthermore, the analysis highlights that, the land 
conservation aspects employed by the formal institutional beneficiaries (formal deed 
holders) are significantly better than that of the encroachers. This shows that farmers 
with a deed for their land have a sense of ownership of the property than their 
                                                 
6 The areas immediately adjacent to the tank is allocated as a reservation and prohibited of all economic 
activities as a conservation act. But this area is perceived to be the most fertile. 
7  Seepage water contributes to the water availability and besides that, water is stolen (Buysse, 2002: 8). 
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counterparts and they are taking steps towards preserving its fertility thus protecting 
their property.  Hence in a point of view of social and environmental benefits, this 
alone would justify the effort taken towards distributing formal land rights to farmers.  
 The situation differs in the case of informal institutions. Where the formal 
institutional beneficiaries did not show any effect towards land productivity, the 
informal institutional beneficiaries show significance in land ownership, agricultural 
inputs and land conservation activities as well as possess better human capital.  The 
informal institutions are used as a tool to overcome the formal institutional constraint 
of transferability of land at the market, to acquire larger land lots. Thus it can be 
interpreted that farmers possessing better human capital are most likely to overcome 
the formal institutional constraints and exploit the available informal institutions, to 
manage a more efficient large scale farming enterprise.  
 Figure 1 demonstrates the land productivity of irrigated lands cultivated with 
paddy in the study area.  Respondents who receive less than 1000kg per season 
consist mainly of the farmers who have leased out their irrigated land and receive an 
agreed amount of paddy, or who are cultivating a shared land without a formal deed. 
Thus their seasonal yield is lesser and does not vary. But the respondents with 
intermediate yield often are owner farmers, experiencing a yield change according to 
the season, with a comparatively higher yield in the Maha season8. Their yields are 
highly susceptible to water scarcity as well as other agricultural problems. On the 
other hand, farmers with larger yields (greater than 7500kg) are mostly farmers who 
have taken others lands on lease. Their yield is greater due to large land area 
cultivated, and varies little seasonally. These large scale farmers have the means and 
                                                 
8 There are two cultivation seasons namely; Maha and Yala which are synonymous with two monsoons. Maha 
Season falls during “North-east monsoon” from September to March in the following year. Yala season is effective 
during the period from May to end of August. When the crop is sown and harvested during above periods, the 
particular season is defined. 
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resources to face common agricultural problems, such as water scarcity or insect 
damages. Therefore, through informal institutions the farmers were able to reduce the 
inherent risk of agriculture to some extent.  
 
Figure 1 Total Paddy Productions in the Area (Including Both Seasons in 2005/06) 
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IV. Concluding Remarks 
  Formal ownership of land does not necessarily improve land productivity. But 
it ameliorates land conservation activities, as farmers with a deed for their land have a 
sense of ownership of the property than their counterparts. This alone would justify 
the effort taken towards distributing formal land rights to farmers.  
 Various land tenure systems exists as survival strategies of the farmer 
community. Although in one aspect it can be defined as highly exploitative, given the 
choices, the farmers perceive these as their best options available.  This also allows 
the farmers to manipulate the existing land regulations and mobilize the land 
resources, so as more efficient farmers have access to large land extents to cultivate, 
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thus improve the productivity. But it could adversely affect the livelihood of the 
poorer farmers, leading to income inequalities and incidence of poverty in the 
community. The formal land institution has imposed restrictions to land transaction to 
eliminate this very fact. But the informal institutions have evolved as a tool to 
overcome the formal institutional constraint of transferability, to acquire larger land 
lots.  
 This emphasize the fact that social safety nets adhered to property rights by 
the government, to eliminate poverty incidence does not always hold. A temporary 
transfer of property rights is not looked upon as a demeanour to poverty, but to 
wellbeing. Therefore this finding warrants taking steps towards loosening some of the 
restrictions on transferability of land rights. 
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